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I. Introduction
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. 1 is the
most cited decision in all of administrative law.2 The significance of Chevron
jurisprudence to modem administrative law cannot be overstated: The doctrine
shapes the federal courts' approach to practically all statutory interpretation
questions when assessing administrative action.3 Since the Supreme Court
handed down this landmark decision, however, the Court's philosophical
approach to statutory interpretation has undergone a dramatic transformation
into hypertextualism. 4 Hypertextualism occurs whenever a court relies on a
technical construction of a phrase or word, even when it appears that such a
1. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)
(holding that where the legislative history of the statute was silent in regard to the issue at hand,
the EPA's interpretation of the statute at issue was a permissible construction and entitled to
deference). In Chevron, the Supreme Court determined that Congress did not specifically
address the instant issue-the applicability of the bubble concept. Id. at 845. The Court then
considered the EPA's interpretation of the statute and concluded that it was a reasonable policy
choice, fully consistent with the principal goals of the statute. Id. at 865. The Court stated that
judges have a duty to respect and defer to legitimate policy choices made by federal agencies.
Id. at 866. Thus, a court must afford considerable weight to an agency's construction of a
statute. Id. at 844. Consequently, the Court held that if a statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the instant issue, the question for the court is simply whether the agency's action was
based on a permissible interpretation of the statute. Id. at 966.
2. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIvE LAW AND REGULATORY PoucY 289 (5th
ed. 2002).
3. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 CoLuM. L. REv. 2097, 2171-72 (2004) ("It is difficult to overstate
the importance of this jurisprudence to modem administrative law."); see also id. at 2172
(describing Chevron as the "template through which federal courts approach virtually all
questions of statutory interpretation when reviewing agency action").
4. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation
to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 749, 752 (1995)
(defining "hypertextualism" as "finding linguistic precision where it does not exist, and relying
exclusively on the abstract meaning of a particular word or phrase even when other evidence
suggests strongly that Congress intended a result inconsistent with that usage").
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construction contradicts congressional intent. This shift to hypertextualism
could have unintended effects on Chevron jurisprudence. The connecting
factor is ambiguity. Hypertextualism discourages judges from finding
ambiguity except in the most extreme situations, 5 while Chevron deference
depends on a broader concept of ambiguity. 6 The two approaches therefore are
incompatible. Further, hypertextualism threatens the efficiency of
administrative agencies, undermines agencies' autonomous decisionmaking and
thwarts textualist objectives.7
This Note presents the Supreme Court's recent decision in Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Services., Inc.8 as a decision that solidified the Court's
adoption of a hypertextualist approach to statutory interpretation. The debate
over the textualist approach versus the pragmatic approach is a constant in the
field of statutory interpretation. 9 Much of the scholarly debate about statutory
interpretation centers on the use of legislative history as a tool of statutory
interpretation'°--simply stated, in the face of an ambiguous statute, textualists
forbid its use and intentionalists encourage it." Ambiguity-specifically, its
absence-is therefore an issue of critical importance for the textualist approach.
But, ambiguity is a core concept for the Chevron doctrine: The central question
5. See discussion infra Part III.B. 1 (explaining how a textualist approach can result in
less deference to agency interpretations).
6. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the effects of ambiguity on the
interpretation of administrative statutes).
7. See discussion infra Parts II.A-C, III.B.3, IV.B (describing the spillover effects of
hypertextualism on the administrative state).
8. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558-59 (2005)
(holding that § 1367 permits diversity jurisdiction to be exercised over plaintiffs failing to
satisfy the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement so long as the other diversity
jurisdiction elements are satisfied and at least one plaintiff satisfies the minimum amount
requirement).
9. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETIcs OF ARISTOTLE 133 (Sir David Ross trans.,
1925) ("When the law speaks universally.., and a case arises on which it is not covered by the
universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by oversimplicity,
to correct the omission-to say what the legislator himself would have said had he been
present .... "); see also John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLuM.
L. REv. 1, 4 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's philosophical divide over the appropriate
course to take in statutory interpretation cases).
10. See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L.
REv. 277, 279 (1990) ("[Tlhe issue of whether and how to use legislative history in determining
the meaning of statutes ought to be a pressing concern to all of us who care about how laws are
made and interpreted .... We need to worry about it....").
11. See Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U.
L. REv. 1023, 1024 (1998) (noting that the "factions have argued particularly about the use of
legislative history as a tool of statutory interpretation").
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in Chevron's "step one" is whether the statute is ambiguous. 2 Without
ambiguity, a court will never advance to step two of Chevron and recognize the
agency interpretation as controlling.13 Ambiguity liberates the agency.
To illustrate the unintended consequences hypertextualism may have on
the modem administrative state, consider a paraphrased version of a
hypothetical posed by Professor Richard Pierce. Congress charges an agency
with implementing a statute that has three provisions, A, B, and C, each of
which can support two meanings, 1 and 2.14 The agency interprets the
provisions to mean Al, B1, and Cl, because it perceives programmatic
advantages to that particular construction.1 5 Decades later, a court reviews the
agency's interpretation under Chevron, and finds the "plain meaning" of the
statute to be A2, BI, and Cl, thus disregarding the agency's Al
interpretation.1 6 Later, a different circuit court finds the "plain meaning" in fact
to be A2, B2, and Cl.17 Consequently, the agency will be forced to implement
its statutory mission in two different ways in two circuits.' 8 If the Supreme
Court then determines that the "plain meaning" is in fact A 1, B2, and C 1, the
agency may not be able to perform its mission at all.' 9
One may not find statutory interpretation trends or the continued vitality of
administrative law doctrines to be of pressing concern. Consider, however, a
more tangible example. Many rights granted to citizens by Congress hinge
upon the chosen construction of a particular statute or a definition of a key
term. For instance, are you a lawyer, faculty member, librarian, engineer, or
architect? Then the collective bargaining and organizational rights of your
profession and many others depend upon the appropriate construction of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Congress enacted the NLRA to provide
12. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) ("First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue .... [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.").
13. See id. at 845 ("Once it determined... that Congress did not actually have an
intent... the question before it was not whether in its view the concept is
'inappropriate' . . . but whether the Administrator's view that it is appropriate in the context of
this particular program is a reasonable one.").
14. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 764 (setting out a hypothetical to illustrate the
consequences of conflicting interpretations of administrative statutes).




19. Pierce, supra note 4, at 763.
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employees with legal protection to freely associate, organize, and bargain
collectively to negotiate terms and conditions of employment. 20 Through the
NLRA, Congress created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to
administer the Act.2' The NLRA does not protect those employees who are
deemed to have supervisory status; 22 thus, the NLRB's interpretation of
"supervisory status" is all-important to the Act's application.
Imagine then that the NLRB relied upon a particular status-determining
test for twenty years, a test consistently upheld by the Supreme Court and the
Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals. 3 The
Sixth Circuit, however, rejects that test, disregarding the agency's interpretation
by relying upon the "plain meaning" of the statutory language.24 Consequently,
a professional residing in a Sixth Circuit state is less likely to be protected than
professionals residing in other states. Suppose that the Supreme Court, using a
textualist approach, then affirms the Sixth Circuit decision, rejecting the test
relied upon by the NLRB for twenty years and substantially narrowing the class
of individuals protected as professionals nationwide. 25 Now, employees in the
majority of the circuits-all of whom followed the test developed by
Congress's chosen interpreter-face the unenviable task of conforming to a
new standard, submitted by five members of the judicial branch.
The above hypothetical, based on an actual case, illustrates the importance
of judicial deference when statutory language is susceptible to multiple
constructions: The NLRB test was true to congressional intent and the policy
26underlying the NLRA. 6 Instead of implicating Chevron, however, the
Supreme Court relied on a hypertextualist approach, ignored the legislative
history and policy arguments reflected in the NLRB test, and "struck down this
important test and compromised the organizational rights of thousands of
professionals and further endangered our administrative system. 27 This is the
20. See Edwin A. Keller, Jr., Death by Textualism: The NLRB 's "Incidental to Patient
Care" Supervisory Status Test for Charge Nurses, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 575, 578 (1996)
(describing the NLRA).
21. Id.
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000) (describing a qualifying employee's organizational
rights).
23. See Keller, supra note 20, at 594 (discussing the court's acceptance of the NLRB's
"incidental to patient care" test).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 599 (discussing the Court decision affirming the Sixth Circuit decision).
26. See id. at 623 ("The [test formulated by the NLRB] was a reasonable interpretation of
an ambiguous statutory phrase grounded in legislative history and a wealth of prior case law. In
addition, the NLRB test was true to the policies underlying the NLRA.").
27. Id.
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threat that a hypertextualist analysis poses in the labor law arena, and, more
broadly, this example illuminates the ramifications of hypertextualism for the
future of Chevron.
A textualist-minded Supreme Court, fixated on "finding" linguistic
precision rather than facilitating agency deference, will impede the efficacy of
the administrative state. 28 In the mid-1990s, the deference-deteriorating effect
of an overly textualist approach received some attention from legal scholars.29
One commentator warned that an unchecked spread of textualism could "wreak
havoc" on the federal administrative system and stated that immediate action
was necessary to prevent the proliferation of this "destructive form of statutory
interpretation. 30  Another commentator expressed the hope that the Court
would "soon abandon[] its new hypertextualist approach" and warned that the
"inevitable result" of failing to do so would be "cacophony and incoherence
throughout the administrative state.'
1
These warnings have not been heeded. Instead, the Supreme Court's
hypertextualist approach has solidified, culminating with its recent decision in
Exxon Mobil.32 Although Exxon Mobil did not involve an administrative law
issue, it signifies a high-water mark of hypertextualism for the Court. Most
troubling, the majority utilized an extremely narrow concept of ambiguity. If
28. See id. at 576 (discussing the "dramatic implications" and the "clear and growing
threat to all federal administrative agencies" presented by the increasing use of a textualist
method to resolve a statutory issue in the labor law arena and beyond).
29. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 354 (1994) [hereinafter Merrill] (discussing the threat textualism poses to
the future of the deference doctrine); Pierce, supra note 4, at 752 (discussing concerns "rooted
in the extremes to which the Court has gone in its use (or abuse) of textualist tools to the
exclusion of other evidence of legislative intent and with the effect of virtually emasculating the
Chevron doctrine"); Keller, supra note 20, at 577 ("If left unchecked, the unpredictable and
haphazard nature of textualism will exact great financial, economic, and social costs, wreaking
havoc in an already less-than-efficient federal administrative system.").
30. Keller, supra note 20, at 577.
31. Pierce, supra note 4, at 752, 781.
32. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549 (2005) (holding
that § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs, even if those
claims do not meet the minimum jurisdictional amount specified in the diversity jurisdiction
statute). In Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the longstanding
circuit split as to the correct interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Id. According to the Exxon
Mobil Court, § 1367 is not ambiguous. Id. at 567. Consequently, the Exxon Mobil Court
refused to resort to legislative history evidencing congressional intent contrary to the Court's
holding. Id. The Exxon Mobil Court stated that even if a resort to legislative history were
appropriate, the Court would not give significant weight to the relevant House Report. Id. at
570. Consequently, the Exxon Mobil Court held that by its plain text, § 1367 authorizes
supplemental jurisdiction over all claims by diverse parties arising out of the same case or
controversy. Id.
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the Court allows this approach to spill over into the administrative context,
"cacophony and incoherence" will plague the administrative state.33
This Note focuses on the unintended consequences of this hypertextualist
approach-primarily, the implicit potential to eradicate the Chevron doctrine
and the threat this phenomenon poses. Part II describes Chevron as a necessary
response to the realities of the modem administrative state and outlines the
indispensable benefits agency interpretations provide. Part III focuses on the
evolution of statutory interpretation into the current hypertextualist approach
and analyzes hypertextualism's dire consequences in the area of administrative
law. Finally, Part IV suggests a two-track approach to questions of ambiguity
and reconciles a broad conception of ambiguity in Chevron-applicable cases
with the underlying goals of textualism.
II. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.: An
Essential Tool of Modern Governance
In Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.,4 the Supreme
Court unanimously established a two-part test to determine when a court should
defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute. As in most statutory
interpretation cases, courts interpreting administrative statutes first ask the
question "Is the statute ambiguous?" in determining whether to accord
deference to an agency's interpretation.35 If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter. Both the court and the agency "must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. 3 6  If, however, the court
determines that Congress has not directly addressed the specific issue at hand,
"the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. " 37 Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous, the second analytical step is to evaluate whether
33. Pierce, supra note 4, at 752.
34. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)
(holding that where the legislative history of the statute was silent in regard to the issue at hand,
the EPA's interpretation of the statute at issue was a permissible construction and entitled to
deference).
35. See id. at 842-43 ("First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue .... [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.").
36. Id. at 842-43.
37. Id.
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the agency has provided a reasonable and permissible interpretation of the
statute.38 If so, the court must defer to that interpretation.39
In the contemporary administrative state, federal administrative agencies
wield immense power.4° Congress grants implicit power to agencies by passing
ambiguous statutes with the intention of allowing agencies the opportunity to
interpret the ambiguity.4 ' Agencies, rather than courts, should interpret these
ambiguous statutes to facilitate efficient governance.42 The Chevron doctrine
affirms this power by mandating judicial deference to reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes.43 Thus, the effectiveness of the Chevron
doctrine depends upon courts having a relatively broad conception of
ambiguity: Without a finding of ambiguity, the benefits of an agency
interpretation go unrealized.
A. Chevron: A Response to the Realities of the Modern Administrative
State
The legislative and judicial branches are ill-suited to perform many of the
daily tasks required in today's complex society thus necessitating allocation of
administrative power to agencies.44 This delegation of government functions to
administrative agencies is certainly not a new phenomenon in the Anglo-
American legal tradition.45  During the past half-century, however, the
38. Id.
39. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
40. See discussion infra Part II.A (describing how the complexity of today's society
demands delegation of power to administrative agencies).
41. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing Congress's intent to authorize the agencies
to resolve statutory ambiguities, rather than the courts).
42. See discussion infra Part II.A-C (supporting the role of agencies in statutory
interpretation).
43. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
("[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.").
44. See Gregory C. Ward, Lussier v. Maryland Racing Commission: Maryland's Court of
Appeals Upholds a Fine Imposed by an Administrative Agency Despite a Lack of Specific
Authorization to Fine from the General Assembly, 27 U. BALT. L. REv. 515, 528-29 (1998)
(discussing the "well-recognized reality that legislative and judicial branches are illsuited to
perform many of the day-to-day functions required of the government") (citing Peter Marra,
Have Administrative Agencies AbandonedReasonability?, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 763, 772,
777 (1996)).
45. See MATTHEw BENDER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.01 (2005) (discussing the
background of the federal administrative process).
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administrative state has experienced exponential growth.4 6 Spurred by
President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal,47 there has been a rapid proliferation
in both the number and variety of agencies. Indeed, "[t]he size and scope of
federal administrative activity has increased during every period in the nation's
history. ',48 In response, American government has adapted itself to a modern
society's evolving needs by permitting Congress to delegate portions of its
lawmaking power to agencies. 49  This grant of congressional latitude is
supported by both traditional principles of judicial deference to legislative
decisions5° and judicial recognition that some degree of delegation to agencies
is necessary to permit the government to function. 51 The Court has stated that
"a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another
would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself
effectively.0
2
Agencies allow for the management of the modern administrative state
without placing impossible burdens of micromanagement upon Congress. With
clearly and narrowly defined fields of responsibility, agencies are able to handle
the sheer volume of record keeping that regulatory administration necessarily
involves, a task that the more established branches of government could not
feasibly handle.53 In this sense, the Chevron doctrine is an indispensable tool to
effective and efficient government. By mandating judicial deference to a
reasonable agency interpretation, the Chevron doctrine assures that well-
46. Id.
47. See Henry G. Manne, The Judiciary and Free Markets, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
11,23 (1997) ("The most powerful source of the dilution of the older structure in American law
was the growth, particularly during and after the 'New Deal' in the 1930s, of vast amounts of
regulatory legislation and the enormous growth of administrative law.... ").
48. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 1.3, at 6 (3d ed. 1994).
49. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 11 (1993)
(explaining that Congress has constitutional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to
create administrative agencies for legislative responsibilities).
50. See Yvette M. Barksdale, The Presidency andAdministrative Value Selection, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 273, 306 n. 192 (1993) ("Stating that [the] Court's jurisprudence has been 'driven' by
recognition that Congress must be permitted to delegate authority to other branches of
government." (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989))).
51. See id. at 306 n. 193 ("Finding that in 'increasingly complex society' Congress is
unable to perform its function without authority to delegate power to agencies 'under broad
general directives."' (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989))).
52. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976); see also Michael J. Klarman, Anti fidelity,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 412-13 (1997) (noting the evisceration of a precise separation of
powers "in order to accommodate the exponential growth of the modem administrative state").
53. See BENDER, supra note 45, § 1.01 (discussing "the manifest advantages of
independent administrative agency action over executive action").
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deliberated decisions54 by an entity with expertise in a specific area will trump a
concededly less-informed judicial interpretation by a politically insulated
court.55
B. Crippling Chevron Eliminates Regulatory Flexibility
Modem challenges demand a flexible administrative environment. A
primary advantage of the Chevron approach is that it permits needed flexibility
by accepting changes in agency interpretation.56 In comparison to courts
limited by stare decisis, an agency is in a better position to know when and how
regulatory interpretations need to change. When a court resolves an ambiguity,
it resolves it permanently unless modified by statutory amendment.57 Under
Chevron, however, an agency may alter its interpretation58 of a statute in
response to advancing technology, new information, and changing political
59pressures.
54. See Barksdale, supra note 50, at 308 (noting that administrative decision-making
processes involve considerable debate and deliberation); see also Colin S. Driver, Policymaking
Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 393, 409-28 (1981) (discussing modem
comprehensive rationality model of administrative policymaking with its emphasis on specifying
goals, identifying alternatives, analyzing consequences, and optimizing choices).
55. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(declaring that the agency will likely have greater expertise in the area of law under
consideration than the court); see also id. (expressing preference for an agency interpretation
over ajudicial interpretation because of political accountability concerns). The majority stated:
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may,
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are
not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices ....
Id.
56. See The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations ofLaw, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 518 (noting that Chevron's approach of accepting
changes in agency interpretation "ungrudgingly seems to me one of the strongest indications
that the Chevron approach is correct").
57. See id. at 517 (discussing the disadvantages of having courts resolve ambiguities).
58. See id ("[T]he agency is free to give the statute whichever of several possible
meanings it thinks most conducive to accomplishment of the statutory purpose .... [T]here is
no apparent justification for holding the agency to its first answer, or penalizing it for a change
of mind.").
59. See id at 518 (recognizing the necessity of agency flexibility in light of modem times
by stating that "[i]f Congress is to delegate broadly, as modem times are thought to demand, it
seems to me desirable that the delegee be able to suit its actions to the times").
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The flexibility of expert administrative agencies provides a major
advantage over Congress's unwieldiness in resolving many government policy
issues that involve intricate and highly complex issues.6 0 This expertise and
flexibility is indispensable in rapidly evolving areas of regulation.61 An
agency's unique expertise in its particular field allows anticipation and
prevention, or, at the least, minimization of potentially adverse costs.
62
Congress lacks this flexibility: "[B]ecause of its lack of expertise, size and
structure, and mode of functioning, [Congress] is able to legislate against
existing evils; it is incapable of effectively anticipating and preventing future
problems. ''63 In comparison to the courts and the legislature, the administrative
process also allows flexibility in its methods of policy formulation.
64
Undoubtedly, delegation of problem areas to the appropriate agency allows
"continuity of attention and clear allocation of responsibility., 65 Chevron
recognizes the reality that an agency is conferred a range of discretion to
"change the law" in response to "new information or even new social attitudes
impressed upon it through the political process., 66 A finding of agency-
60. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., An Issue-Driven Strategy for Review ofAgency Decisions,
43 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 516 (1991) (stating that "agencies embody special expertise" and
maintain a "superior capacity for compiling the information" and "synthesizing the
information"); Marra, supra note 44, at 767 ("The justification for the delegation of
congressional power to administrative agencies include Congress's inability to handle technical
issues and act efficiently and effectively.").
61. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("[O]ur jurisprudence has
been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with
ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability
to delegate power under broad general directives.").
62. See BENDER, supra note 45, § 1.01 (noting that agencies are "best qualified" to
anticipate and prevent economic consequences).
63. Id.
64. See Scott A. Zebrak, The Future of NLRB Rulemaking: Analyzing the Mixed Signals
Sent by the Implementation of the Health Care Bargaining Unit Rule and by the Proposed Beck
Union Dues Relegation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 125, 128 (1994) (discussing the choice between
rulemaking and adjudication); David L. Shapiro, The Choice ofRulemaking or Adjudication in
the Development ofAdministrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921, 921 (1965) (discussing the
flexibility of administrative processes and noting that "[while] a legislature must normally
confine itself to the declaration of generally applicable standards of conduct, and a court must
deal with a problem as defined by the particular controversy before it, an administrative agency
may often choose between these approaches.. .
65. BENDER, supra note 45, § 1.01.
66. See Scalia, supra note 56, at 518-19 (recognizing that when an agency "changes the
law" it is not admitting that it "got the law wrong;" instead, the agency is simply responding to
changing societal attitudes or advanced information, "all within the limited range of discretion
to 'change the law' conferred by the governing statute").
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liberating ambiguity under Chevron step one thus permits a dynamic
construction of the statute rather than a static judicial interpretation.
C. Chevron: A Political Choice
Chevron defined a new interpretive regime, one resting on the premise that
an implied delegation of lawmaking power to agencies lies within statutory
ambiguity.67 When adopting a particular method of interpretation, judges
inevitably "identify and promote their political values. ' 68 Accordingly, in
establishing this new regime, Chevron defined the relative roles of the
legislature, agencies, and courts in formulating the substance of administrative
law.69 When Congress unambiguously expresses its intentions regarding the
content of the law, Chevron recognizes the primacy of the legislature: The
congressional mandate controls.70 When a statute is ambiguous, however,
Chevron operates upon a default rule that Congress delegates to the agency, not
to the court, the authority to resolve the statutory ambiguity.7 In comparison to
67. See Michael P. Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux: Mead and the Shrinking
Domain of Statutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 673,674 (2002) (discussing the interpretive
regime established in Chevron).
68. Id. at 674 n.5; see CASS R. SuNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT
168-69 (1996) ("People trying to choose an interpretive method must decide how to allocate
power among various groups and institutions-indeed, allocating power is what the choice of an
interpretive method does."); see also SuNSTEIN, supra, at 174 ("[A] system of legal
interpretation is inevitably a function of decisions that are, broadly speaking, political in
character."); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. Cm. L.
REv. 685, 691-92 (1999) (discussing the political choices involved in choosing a method of
statutory construction). Manning states:
Selecting an interpretive methodology thus involves inevitable choices about the
institutional allocation of power. If courts give strong deference to agencies'
interpretations of the statutes they administer, that arrangement shifts law
elaboration authority away from judges and toward the executive. If courts reject
the authority of legislative history, they shift power away from committees and bill
sponsors and towards agencies and courts. If courts start from an assumption of
strong legislative supremacy in statutory cases, they define themselves as
subordinates of the legislature.
Id.
69. See Healy, supra note 67, at 675 (stating that "[t]he canon of construction identified in
Chevron has played a critical role in defining the relative roles of legislature, agency, and court
in developing the content of public law").
70. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(recognizing the primacy of the legislature by holding that "the court... must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress").
71. See id. at 843 ("[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
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the court, the agency is in a better position to make an unresolved policy
choice-courts should not use statutory interpretation as a means to impose
their political stance on a public to which they are not accountable.7 2 The
delegation of interpretive authority is a direct result of the statute's ambiguity:
"[T]he default rule applies regardless of whether the delegation to the agency
was express or implied, intended or unintended."7 3 Chevron's allocation of
lawmaking power was thus based on the Court's judgment that the agency is
best suited to interpret and implement statutes needing a determinate meaning.
It follows from the above discussion that one justification for favoring
agency interpretations is to comport with congressional intent: The
administrative state is based on Congress passing intentionally ambiguous
statutes on the assumption that agencies will interpret them. The Chevron
doctrine merely states the courts' duty to refrain from making policy decisions
by creating "an across-the-board presumption that, in the case of ambiguity,
agency discretion is meant. 74 In this sense, Chevron provides a background
presumption upon which Congress can legislate, as "Congress now knows that
the ambiguities it creates, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will be
resolved, within the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but
by a particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known." 7
Another justification for preferring an agency interpretation to a judicial
interpretation is that an agency is more democratically responsive and thus
of the statute.").
72. See Healy, supra note 67, at 675 (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 883, 861 (2001) (citations omitted) ("Choosing between two or
more permissible interpretations of a statute is a political act .... [a] robust deference doctrine
therefore helps minimize the occasions in which courts are tempted to employ statutory
interpretation to impose their policy preferences on a public to which they are not
accountable.")).
73. See id. at 675-76 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865). The Court stated that:
Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at
this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility
for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it
simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable
to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side decided to
take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency. Forjudicial purposes, it
matters not which of these things occurred.
Id.
74. Scalia, supra note 56, at 516; see also Chevron, 467 U.S at 866 ("[F]ederal judges-
who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who
do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the
struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones...
75. Scalia, supra note 56, at 517.
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better suited to make policyjudgments.76 The Chevron doctrine is premised on an
understanding that Congress prefers a politically accountable agency-rather than a
politically insulated judge-to resolve statutory ambiguities.7 7 Chevron emphasizes
that an agency's "democratic pedigree"--the President generally controls the
agency's policy judgments-puts it in a better position than a court to make
judgments about statutory meaning.7" Although executive agency heads are not
directly elected by the public, they are directly accountable to the President, who
wields both appointment and removal power.79 An agency will thus be susceptible
to the influence of the public's changing judgment and the executive's goals.80 In
this sense, Chevron acknowledges "original constitutional commitments to electoral
accountability by presuming that Congress has selected agencies rather than courts
to resolve serious ambiguities in agency-administered statutes. 8 1 By committing
76. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864 ("[Pjolicy arguments are more properly addressed to
legislators or administrators, not to judges.").
77. Id. at 865-66. The Court stated that:
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may,
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are
not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities ....
The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving
the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones:
"Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches."
Id. (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
78. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law
Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1056 (1998) (discussing the notion of an agency having a
"democratic pedigree").
79. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (discussing the President's
"general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment
and removal of executive officers"). Although independent agencies are not subject to this same
oversight, they are certainly more politically accountable than a court. See Peter M. Shane,
Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 57 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 596, 609 (1989) ("Independent agencies, even if not required to do so, may nonetheless
choose to align their policies with those of the President.").
80. See Sunstein, supra note 78, at 1056 n.212 (citing JERRY L. MASHAw, GREED, CHAos,
AND GOVERNANCE 131-57 (1997)) ("In some ways, perhaps, agencies have a stronger
democratic pedigree than Congress itself, though the Chevron Court does not so argue.").
81. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 626 n.77 (1996); see Thomas W.
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 978-79 (1992)
[hereinafter Merrill, Deference] (explaining judicial justifications for preferring administrative
interpretations to those of courts) ("Democratic theory supplied the justification: agency
decisionmaking is always more democratic than judicial decisionmaking because all agencies
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policy decisions to the executive rather than the judicial branch, the Chevron
doctrine reinforces fundamental principles of our democratic system.82 When
presented with an ambiguous administrative statute, the reviewing court best
satisfies its constitutional obligation by accepting the agency's sensible exercise of
discretion within congressionally delegated bounds.
Another reason for preferring an agency interpretation over a judicial
interpretation is based on an agency expertise rationale: Congress creates agencies
to manage a relatively specific area and gives them the resources and tools to do
so.84 In comparison to courts, agencies have greater expertise and greater resources
to give complex issues the attention they merit85 Judges lack familiarity with the
often highly technical, complex, and obscure information critical to agency decision
making. Judge and scholar Patricia M. Wald articulated this concept, stating that:
[A]sking judges to familiarize themselves enough with the policies and
operations of the dozens of agencies that appear in hundreds of cases a year, and
whose functions vary from labor to shipping to nuclear energy to gas regulation,
so that we can participate as equals in their good governance, is asking a great
deal. 6
Courts recognized this expertise rationale for judicial deference to agency decisions
long before Chevron.87
are accountable (to some degree) to the President, and the President is elected by the people."));
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of
Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1256 (1989) (noting that "Chevron's reasoning reflects
an effort to reconcile the administrative state with principles of democracy"); see also
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 19 (1962) (stating that policymaking is
better left to "representative institutions, born of the electoral process").
82. See Manning, supra note 81, at 627 ("It is more consistent with the assumptions of
our constitutional system to vest discretion in more expert, representative, and accountable
administrative agencies.., a reviewing court satisfies its Marbury obligation simply by
accepting an agency's reasonable exercise of discretion within the boundaries of the authority
delegated by Congress.").
83. Id.
84. See id. at 681 ("Congress's decision to commit lawmaking power to agencies vests
substantial regulatory authority in specialized bodies with knowledge, expertise, and experience
that generalist courts lack. Agencies may therefore have insights into regulatory history,
context, or purpose that may not be readily apparent to even the most seasoned federal judge.").
85. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,865 (stating
that "[jludges are not experts in the field").
86. Patricia M. Wald, The "New Administrative Law"-- With the Same Old Judges in It?,
1991 DuKE L.J. 647, 658-59.
87. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency
Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 735, 736 n.3 (2002)
(noting that for decades prior to Chevron, the Supreme Court directed lower courts to take a
deferential approach in reviewing agency decisions); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
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The Court also uses the expertise rationale to legitimize an agency's combined
roles-courts have recognized that Congress intended to create administrative
entities with "specialized knowledge and experience in interpreting and enforcing a
federal regulatory regime."8 By performing a combination of executive, legislative,
and judicial duties, the agency is able to develop and to sustain expertise in a
specific area.89 Previous experience with a certain area and problems that may arise
within that area can enhance the agency's ability to deal with similar problems
efficiently and effectively.90 Thus, courts can generally trust an agency to provide a
suitable interpretation for a statute due to the agency's "intense familiarity with the
history and purposes of the legislation at issue" and "their practical knowledge of
what will best effectuate those purposes."9' This enhanced agency expertise
rationale buttresses Chevron's doctrine ofjudicial deference to reasonable agency
interpretations.92
Ii. The Effect of Hypertextualism on the Administrative State
A. Overview of Statutory Interpretation
For most of this country's history, judges have been pragmatic in their
approach to statutory interpretation, drawing from such conventions as legislative
194, 209 (1947) ("[E]xplaining that agency decisions reflecting 'the product of administrative
experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the statutory policies,
and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts' are 'entitled to the greatest amount of weight
by appellate courts."').
88. Krotoszynski, supra note 87, at 741; see FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 720
(1948) ("We are persuaded that the Commission's long and close examination of the questions
it here decided has provided it with precisely the experience that fits it for performance of its
statutory duty.").
89. See id. at 741 (discussing how the "marriage of functions" within an agency allows an
agency to develop and maintain expertise).
90. See id. (referring to Justice Black's view that permitting agencies to perform multiple
functions improves the agency's work product); see also Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 702 (stating
that forcing agencies to separate functions would debase the work product as "experience
acquired from their work as commissioners would be a handicap instead of an advantage. Such
was not the intendment of Congress").
91. Scalia, supra note 56, at 514-17.
92. In fact, some would argue that the primary justification for deference should rest on
the expertise rationale, rather than Chevron's primary implied delegation rationale. See
Krotoszynski, supra note 87, at 754 ("In my view, Chevron departed from the primary
justification for affording agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes deference:
administrative agencies possess greater expertise than the generalist courts that review their
decisions.").
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history, the plain meaning rule, and considerations of statutory purpose.93 Under
this traditional view, judges would make use of all available interpretive materials in
trying to understand ambiguous statutes.94 Recent decades, however, have been
remarkable for statutory interpretation. If the Court's decision in Exxon Mobil is
any indication, this traditional view may be all but extinct. Although gradual at
first, it seems that the Supreme Court has undergone a major transformation in
adopting a hypertextualist 95 approach to statutory interpretation cases and the Court
is now quite reluctant to rely on traditional interpretative methods. A new breed of
textualism has replaced this pragmatic approach-one in which the Court imputes
clear congressional intent and refuses to consider traditional interpretational tools by
declining to find ambiguity even in the vaguest of statutes. The most serious
implication of this aggressive application of textualism is its spill-over effect in the
interpretation of administrative statutes.
1. Textualism Versus Pragmatism
To understand fully the potential impact of the Court's approach to
statutory interpretation, a more detailed explanation of the pragmatic and
textualist approaches is warranted. Both approaches begin by looking at the
relevant language of a statute. After that point, the two quickly diverge. 96 A
court using a pragmatic approach makes use of all available and potentially
relevant interpretative materials, such as committee reports and floor
statements, in an attempt to understand ambiguous statutes and draw
interpretative inferences from these materials.97 Pragmatists recognize the
underlying reliability issues inherent in the use of extraneous resources, as such
93. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 351-52 (discussing the historical transformation in
statutory interpretation techniques).
94. See John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical
Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 489,
490 (2001) (describing the traditional view of statutory interpretation).
95. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 351 (noting that there has been "a major transformation
in the way the Supreme Court approaches statutory interpretation cases"); see also Pierce, supra
note 4, at 752 (using "hypertextualism" in reference to two interpretive techniques: "finding
linguistic precision where it does not exist, and relying exclusively on the abstract meaning of a
particular word or phrase even when other evidence suggests strongly that Congress intended a
result inconsistent with that usage").
96. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and Empiricist,
8 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 747, 747 (1995) (characterizing Justice Breyer's approach to statutory
interpretation).
97. See Roberts, supra note 94, at 490 (describing the traditional approach to statutory
interpretation).
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sources are sometimes murky and contradictory. 98 An overriding respect and
understanding of legislative procedures tempers and compensates for this
drawback and provides a foundation for the pragmatic approach.99 For
example, the use of a committee report can provide context and explanation for
otherwise ambiguous statutes by offering insight into the purposes of the
legislation. 00 This pragmatic view (also referred to as the traditional or
intentionalist approach) has dominated the federal courts for the majority of the
last century.' 10 Over the past couple of decades, however, the textualist
approach has been gaining momentum.
Textualism is "a sophisticated theory of interpretation which readily
acknowledges that the meaning of the words depends on the context in which
they are used." 102 Using this approach, judges decipher statutes in accordance
with presumably objective criteria to determine the significance and meaning of
the various words, phrases, and sentences. 10 3 Textualists criticize legislative
materials as unreliable, confusing, and misleading in determining a statute's
meaning. 1°4 Accordingly, textualist judges rely almost exclusively on statutory
words and structure to assess what the ordinary reader of a statute would
understand the words to mean. In other words, the goal is to ascertain the
statute's "plain" meaning. 10 5  Textualism thus requires an objective
interpretation; rather than attempting to discern the intentions of the legislators,
the textualist judge asks what the ordinary reader would have understood the
statute to mean. 10 6 By using the ordinary reader perspective, textualism has the
practical effect of reducing-sometimes eliminating-consideration of
98. See id. at 490-91 (noting that traditionalists will concede that use of interpretive
materials "should be tempered by commonsense concerns about reliability").
99. See id. at 491 (characterizing the traditionalist position "by an overriding respect for
and understanding of the legislative process").
100. See id. at 566 (noting that committee reports are the most important means of setting
out the committee's views on the purposes, background, and meaning of statutory text).
101. See id. at 491 (stating that the traditionalist approach "has been dominant in the
federal courts for most of the last one hundred years, and certainly in the period since World
War II").
102. Merrill, supra note 29, at 352.
103. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 750 (comparing textualist tools to intentionalist tools).
104. See Roberts, supra note 94, at 492 (stating the textualist position that legislative
materials should be ignored because they are unreliable, confusing, and contradictory).
105. See id. at 491 (discussing textualist reliance on "statutory words, related statutory
provisions, statutory structure, and certain canons of interpretation").
106. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 352 ("The critical assumption is that interpretation
should be objective rather than subjective; that is, the judge should ask what the ordinary reader
of a statute would have understood the words to mean at the time of enactment, not what the
intentions of the enacting legislators were.").
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legislative history in statutory interpretation.10 7  Instead of relying on
interpretive sources, textualists place heavy emphasis on dictionary definitions,
grammar rules, punctuation, and canons of construction. 10
8
Both the pragmatic approach and the textualist approach have distinct
advantages and drawbacks, and both are capable of abuse when taken to the
extreme. For a period of time in the 1970s and the 1980s, some judges
implemented an extreme version of pragmatism that permitted them to advance
their own objective by attributing to Congress intentions that Congress never
had. 109 Judges were able to reach their desired outcome by carefully selecting
excerpts from a statute's conflicting legislative history to comport with the
judge's preference, conveniently ignoring unfavorable passages in the
history.10 Beginning in the mid-1980s, criticism of the overuse of legislative
history, stemming primarily from realist and functionalist concerns, began to
spread.' With Justice Scalia's arrival on the Supreme Court in the late 1980s,
the attacks on the pragmatic approach gained momentum and force. 12 In the
1990s, Justice Scalia and like-minded textualists further developed and
reinforced these criticisms, and a modem form of textualism began to
emerge. 113
2. The Rise of Textualism
To some extent, the revival of the textualist approach was a healthy
development counteracting judges' misuse of legislative history.' ' If used as
intended, the textualist approach to statutory interpretation makes sense; there
is little opposition to textualism's basic premise "that the statutory text is the
107. See id. at 352 ("In practical terms, the principal implication of this ordinary reader
perspective is to banish virtually all consideration of legislative history from statutory
interpretation.").
108. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 750 (discussing the tools of textualism).
109. See id. at 752 (discussing extreme versions of intentionalism).
110. Id.




114. See Bradford C. Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons of Statutory Construction:
Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive
Agencies, 86 Ky. L.J. 527, 539 (1997) [hereinafter Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons] ("To
some extent, the revival of textualism during the 1980s was a healthy reaction to the misuse by
many judges of legislative history.").
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most authoritative interpretive criterion."' 15 With proper use, textualism can
curb potential abuse of legislative history by encouraging judges to interpret the
law rather than reconstruct the legislature's intentions to reflect a desired
outcome. 1 6 Thus, a primary objective of textualism is to discern the plain
meaning of the text.1 17 This objective of textualism stems from its underlying
philosophy-that unelected judges have no authority to decide what the law
ought to be; rather, "the text is the law and it is the text that must be
observed."" 8
Modern textualism, however, is not merely a revitalization of the
traditional plain meaning rule. 119 By insisting on applying the textualist
doctrine even when the plain or ordinary meaning of the text is not readily
discernible, a textualist judge risks the unfortunate consequence of destroying
ambiguity. 20  Textualism thus becomes susceptible to a major criticism
associated with legislative history. Just as judges can manipulate or reconstruct
legislative history to reach a desired outcome, so too can judges manipulate the
textualist doctrine to support a different interpretation by declaring the statute
unambiguous and refusing to consider other interpretations or extrinsic
evidence. What was described as "new textualism" in the early 1990s is not so
novel anymore; rather, it has become the preferred choice of statutory
interpretation for the Court today. 2 1  Heavy or absolute reliance on this
115. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 354 (1990).
116. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(articulating the fundamental textualist canon by stating that "[j]udges interpret laws rather than
reconstruct legislators' intentions").
117. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 22 (1997) ("The text is the law,
and it is the text that must be observed.").
118. Id. Manyjustices support this statement. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on
the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528 (1947) ("Only a day or two ago-when
counsel talked of the intention of a legislature, I was indiscreet enough to say I don't care what
their intention was. I only want to know what the words mean."); see also OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs 207 (1920) ("We do not inquire what the legislature meant;
we ask only what the statute means.") (quoted in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 U.S. 384, 397 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
119. Merrill, supra note 29, at 351, 352; see also United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 278
U.S. 269, 269 (1929) (endorsing and defining the plain meaning rule: "Where the language of
an enactment is clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or
impracticable consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the
meaning intended").
120. See discussion supra Part IV.B (describing how the nature of textualism deteriorates
deference by reducing findings of ambiguity).
121. See Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 347 (2005) (discussing
textualism as a leading approach to statutory interpretation).
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hypertextualist approach to statutory interpretation effectively eliminates
statutory ambiguity. Use of the textualist method of statutory construction
allows courts to attribute a "plain meaning" to language that most would
characterize as ambiguous or contradictory. 122  Modem textualism, or
hypertextualism, thus subverts the underlying philosophy of textualism by
sanctioning substitution of judicial judgment for legislative or administrative
judgment.
3. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services., Inc.: A High-Water Mark for
the Court
Exxon Mobil further solidifies the Supreme Court's change in judicial
philosophy. It is an extraordinary example of the Court's remarkable resolve to
attribute a "plain meaning" to statutory language that has been universally
controverted for many years. 123 In Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court illustrated
this resolve to declare a statute unambiguous when it held that U.S.C. § 1367's
plain text prohibited reliance on legislative history that contradicted the
majority's interpretation. 24 The Exxon Mobil Court implicitly adopted the
"active ambiguity" approach discussed in Part IV.
122. Pierce, supra note 4, at 752. Pierce notes that:
The Court now rarely defers to an agency's construction of ambiguous statutory
language because a majority of Justices have now begun to use textualist methods
of construction that routinely allow them to attribute "plain meaning" to statutory
language that most observers would characterize as ambiguous or internally
inconsistent. Moreover, the Court has shown a remarkable willingness to attribute
a "plain meaning" to statutory language that was nearly universally believed to have
a contrary meaning for many decades.
Id.
123. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 577 (2005)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the courts of appeals have been sharply divided as to the
proper interpretation of § 1367). One need not look far to find the sharp divide. Compare
Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928,930 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that
"§ 1367 supersedes Clark and allows pendent-party jurisdiction when the additional parties have
claims worth less than [the jurisdictional minimum]"), andln re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524,529
(5th Cir. 1995) ("[U]nder § 1367 a district court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
members of a class, although they did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, as did
the class representatives."), with Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214,222
(3d Cir. 1999) (declaring § 1367 ambiguous and deferring to legislative history to reject
argument that § 1367 overrules Zahn and thus preserves the complete diversity rule), and
Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631,641 (10th Cir. 1998) (relying on legislative history in
order to preserve Zahn's prohibition of claim aggregation in diversity class actions).
124. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567 (2005) (interpreting
§ 1367 "in light of other statutory provisions and our established jurisprudence").
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To anyone familiar with § 1367, the declaration of the statute as
unambiguous is unnerving. The statute and its intended meaning have been the
source of much debate among judges, litigators, distinguished scholars, and
especially civil procedure students. Even the justices of the Supreme Court, • • 125
were unable to agree on the statute's proper interpretation. 2 Unable to resolve
the controversy, the Court deadlocked 4-4, with Justice O'Connor recusing
herself.' 26  The mere fact that the justices themselves drew conflicting
inferences from the same definitional text would seem to be the principal
indication that the statute is ambiguous.
Despite the disputed meaning of the statute in Exxon Mobil, five justices
were able to declare § 1367 unambiguous.' 27 This is a remarkable finding
considering the strong alternative interpretation set forth by Justice Ginsburg,
an interpretation supported by three other justices and the statute's legislative
history.128 Perhaps textualist justices define "ambiguity" differently. However,
the dictionary (ironically, a preferred textualist tool) defines the term
"ambiguity" as "capable of being understood in two or more possible senses or
ways."'129 Two possible explanations were offered for the supplemental
jurisdiction statute at issue in Exxon Mobil, making it logical to conclude that
the statute is ambiguous and subject to the deferential standard advocated by
this Note. 30 In this sense, Exxon Mobil illustrates the chief concern with the
textualist approach: Courts will defy ambiguity simply by stating that there is
none.
This Note does not argue that the Exxon Mobil Court misinterpreted
§ 1367. There are certainly strong arguments for the legitimacy of the
majority's decision.' 3' Rather, this Note takes issue with the method employed
125. See Free v. Abbott Labs., 529 U.S. 333, 333 (2000) (granting certiorari to determine
the meaning of § 1367; the court was unable to resolve the controversy and divided 4-4,
affirming without opinion).
126. Id.
127. See Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 567 (rejecting an alternative interpretation "simply
because § 1367 is not ambiguous").
128. See id. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that "the Court has made the
remarkable declaration that its reading of the statute is so obviously correct-and Justice
Ginsburg's so obviously wrong-that the text does not even qualify as 'ambiguous"').
129. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 66 (11th ed. 2003); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 33 (2d pocket ed. 2001) (defining ambiguity as "an uncertainty of meaning or
intention, as in a contractual term or statutory provision").
130. See discussion infra Part IV.C (outlining a "deferential" ambiguity approach for
statutory interpretation in the administrative context).
131. For example, textualists often argue that legislative history is unreliable, as did the
Exxon Mobil majority. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568-70
(2005) (discussing how "legislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory"
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by the Court to reach its decision. Exxon Mobil is illustrative of textualism
taken to the extreme and potentially signals the death of ambiguity, or, at the
very least, the increasing proclivity of the Court to declare statutes
unambiguous. By effectively eliminating or drastically reducing ambiguity, the
Supreme Court risks the unintended consequence of rejecting the vast majority
of agency interpretations at Chevron's first step.
B. The Impact of Hypertextualism on Chevron
1. Textualist Judges are Less Likely to Defer to Agency Interpretations
Theoretically, a textualist approach could result in either greater or less
deference to an agency-the result should depend on whether the statutory text
is clear.132 In practice, however, most judges using the textualist approach are
prone to believe that they can "find" the proper construction of the statute using
textualist tools without any assistance from an agency. 3 3 Textualism's very
methodology may lead judges to believe that they are more adept at statutory
interpretation than agencies.134 "In effect, the textualist interpreter does not
find the meaning of the statute so much as construct the meaning. Such a
person very likely will experience some difficulty in deferring to the meanings
that other institutions have developed."'135 In this sense, textualism may be
associated with a certain style of judging that "seems to transform statutory
interpretation into a kind of exercise in judicial ingenuity. The textualistjudge
treats questions of interpretation like a puzzle to which it is assumed there is
one right answer."'136 Cleverness and creativity are assets in such an exercise-
the outcome may turn on the location of a comma, on a variety of linguistic
data, or by rifling through different dictionaries until locating the "right"
and that trying to determine the intention of the enacting legislators "is a hopeless task"). This
is certainly a legitimate argument for a narrower definition of ambiguity in the non-
administrative context.
132. See Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-
Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking is Better than Judicial Literalism,
53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1231, 1248 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court's application of
Chevron given a textualist approach).
133. Id.
134. See Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons, supra note 114, at 576 (arguing that
textualist judges are less likely to follow Chevron).
135. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 752 (discussing the results of Thomas Merrill's study of
Supreme Court decisionmaking in the 1992 term).
136. Merrill, supra note 29, at 372.
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definition.1 37 Also, by rejecting legislative history as a tool of statutory
interpretation, a textualist judge must become creative out of necessity. 13 8
Logically, with fewer tools at his disposal, the textualist judge, "like the painter
working with a small palette-necessarily has to become more imaginative in
resolving questions of statutory interpretation."' 39 This active and creative
approach to statutory interpretation is clearly out of sync with the Chevron
doctrine. 1
40
Additionally, an active textualist approach to statutory interpretation does
not comport with an attitude of deference to Congress or to an agency because
it endorses an autonomous interpreter model. 141 Chevron is premised upon the
model of courts as faithful agents-first, faithful agents of Congress, but in the
face of ambiguity from which no legislative instruction can be discerned, then
faithful agents of administrative agencies. 142 Textualism rejects this faithful
agent model and instead adopts "a model of courts as autonomous interpreters
who seek answers to questions of statutory meaning through application of the
ordinary reader perspective, supplemented by various judge-made rules of
interpretation.' 43 This autonomous interpreter model has spill-over effects into
the administrative area-"[o]nce courts embrace this autonomous interpreter
model when dealing with legislative materials, it may be difficult to shift gears
and assume the posture of the faithful agent when dealing with executive
branch agencies."' 144 Thus, although the language may be subject to multiple
interpretations, a textualist is intent on finding the "objective" meaning and may
consequently disregard a permissible agency construction.
Some scholars have hypothesized that due to textualism's influence, the
Court has developed an increasing antipathy toward legislative history and
pragmatic tools as an aid to statutory interpretation, which in turn has resulted
in a more general reluctance to find ambiguity in statutory language. 145 Some
137. See id. at 372 (comparing questions of statutory interpretation to a puzzle in which
"[tihe task is to assemble the various pieces of linguistic data, dictionary definitions, and canons
into the best, most coherent, explanatory account of the meaning of the statute").
138. Id. at 373.
139. Id.
140. See id. (suggesting that "the eclipse of the deference doctrine is likely to last as long as
textualism remains dominant").
141. Merrill, supra note 29, at 372.
142. See id. at 353 (discussing the fundamental problem of Chevron's basis on a model of
courts as faithful agents).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 777 (identifying various theories to explain the Court's
dramatic transformation in its statutory interpretation approach); Merrill, supra note 29, at 363-
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of the justices are so hostile to the use of legislative history that they will
dissent from or concur with the majority opinion solely to express their
displeasure.146 Most consistently, Justice Scalia has a practice of refusing to
join opinions relying on legislative history. 47 In this most extreme version of
the textualist position, Justice Scalia rejects nearly all uses of legislative
history. 48 Justice Scalia's adamant stance, often echoed by Justice Thomas,
149
provides incentive for the other justices to abandon references to legislative
history in their own opinions, at least if they need Scalia's or Thomas's vote to
form a majority.1 50 As none of the pragmatic justices refuse to join opinions
that ignore legislative history, there is no counterweight to the textualist
justices' unyielding stance.' 5' Thus, there exists a powerful voting incentive
for justices to find a "plain meaning" using textual tools rather then admitting
ambiguity and thus opening the door to secondary sources. 5 2 An opinion
based on legislative history will surely cost a justice at least a couple of votes;
no votes are lost by avoiding legislative history and instead declaring the statute
"unambiguous" by means of textualist methods. 53  Consequently, the
remaining justices, though not adamant textualists, regularly compose very
66 (noting the importance of declaring a statute unambiguous in order to build voting
coalitions).
146. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 647 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion except its reliance... on a Senate Committee Report to
establish the meaning of the statute at issue here."); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 390 (2000) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring) ("Of course even if all of the Court's
invocations of legislative history were not utterly irrelevant, I would still object to them.");
O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 97, 101 (1996) (Scalia, O'Connor, & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting) (declaring the statute unambiguous and expressing displeasure at the majority's
making a "snippet of legislative history relevant").
147. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 365 (discussing Justice Scalia's critical role in the rapid
spread of textualism).
148. See Roberts, supra note 94, at 491 (noting that this position is "relentlessly
championed" by Justice Scalia).
149. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 365 ("The arrival of Justice Thomas, who has taken up a
similar stance, effectively doubles Justice Scalia's voting clout in this regard.").
150. See id. (commenting that "the writing Justice knows that if legislative history is
employed he or she will lose majority status with respect to at least a portion of the opinion").
151. See id. (noting that the "defenders of legislative history.., have adopted no such
irredentist stance").
152. See id. (noting that the defenders of legislative history have not adopted such an
irredentist position).
153. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 365 ("In short, the internal dynamic on the Court is such
that each justice now has an incentive to abandon all references to legislative history in his or
her opinions, at least if the Justice has any hope of attracting the votes of Justices Scalia and
Thomas.").
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"Scalia-esque" opinions. 54 Furthermore, this pattern is likely to continue so
long as Justices Scalia and Thomas maintain their inflexible position and so
long as their votes remain centrally important to other justices in forming voting
coalitions. 55 Dogmatic hypertextualism thus makes a court substantially less
likely to find ambiguity in a given statutory text.
The hypertextualist movement is unlikely to abate anytime soon. Indeed,
the Court's recent change in composition will likely favor textualism. Newly
appointed Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will likely be receptive to
these views as "[b]oth Roberts and Alito give every indication of being
textualists as they examine statutes." 56 When adopting a particular method of
interpretation, judges inevitably make political choices as they determine how
best to allocate power among various institutions. 57 Textualism, in the non-
administrative context, shifts power away from the legislative branch and
toward the executive and judicial branches and is typically associated with
conservative political views. 158 Thus, it is a trend likely to continue with the
federal judiciary's recent influx of avowedly conservative judges.1
59
2. Why Ambiguity Matters: The Core of Chevron Deference
Statutory interpretation in the area of administrative law is unique in that
specialized agencies are available to interpret the law. But if courts are
unwilling to find ambiguity in statutes, cases to which Chevron applies will
never get past step one. The court, rather than the agency, will construe the
statute and the benefits of agency interpretation will not be realized. As
discussed in Part III, agencies have greater expertise, are more democratically
154. See id. (noting that the remaining justices' opinions often look like they were "written
in the workshops of Justices Scalia and Thomas").
155. Id. at 365-66. Justice Scalia has shown no sign of changing his position in recent
opinions. See Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 647 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I
join the Court's opinion except its reliance... on a Senate Committee's Report to establish the
meaning of the statute at issue here.").
156. Julia K. Stronks, Breyer v. Scalia: Will Alito Be an Activist or a Textualist?, SEATrLE
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2006), available at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.
cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=sundaystronksl 5&date=20060115&query=stronks.
157. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 168-69 (1996)
("[A]llocating power is what the choice of an interpretive method does.").
158. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHm.
L. REV. 685, 692 (1999) ("If courts reject the authority of legislative history, they shift power
away from committees and bill sponsors and toward agencies and courts.").
159. See Stronks, supra note 156 ("Both Roberts and Alito give every indication of being
textualists as they examine statutes. This makes them similar to Scalia.").
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responsive, and have greater resources to consider complex issues. Judicial
usurpation of this administrative power runs contrary to congressional intent
and eliminates regulatory flexibility, a necessity of modem government.
Chevron was decided in a pretextualist era in which virtually every justice
routinely considered legislative history.160 Thus, it is not surprising that the
decision describes step one as a search for the "intentions',16 1 of the legislature,
and consequently expects an examination of legislative history to discern those
intentions. The Chevron test was originally intended to be highly deferential.
With the rise of the hypertextualist analysis, however, Chevron deference may
become a dead letter.'
62
Step one of Chevron requires the court to determine if the statute at issue
is ambiguous.163 The significance of the textualist trend for Chevron becomes
immediately clear: With no ambiguity, courts will never proceed to the second
step. And with no step two, a reasonable agency interpretation will carry no
weight. The Court has stated that Chevron deference "is premised on the
theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from
Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps."' 64 If Chevron is to have
any significance at all, a statute must be regarded as ambiguous, even when a
court feels its own interpretation is superior to that of the agency, so long as
two or more reasonable interpretations exist. 161
As the Court has changed its choice of statutory construction tools and the
way in which it employs them, it has gradually ceased to uphold agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutory language because it rarely recognizes the
ambiguity.' 66 The highly deferential Chevron test was created in part as a
160. Merrill, supra note 29, at 353 (discussing the "rather obvious problem is that Chevron
was decided during the pretextualist area when legislative history was routinely considered by
all Justices").
161. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 937,842-43 (1984).
162. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 980-85 (1992) (attributing the "decline in reliance on traditional contextual factors for
determining whether deference is appropriate" to the emergence of the Chevron doctrine).
163. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (stating that the first question is whether "the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue").
164. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
165. See Scalia, supra note 56, at 520 ("If Chevron is to have any meaning, then,
congressional intent must be regarded as 'ambiguous' not just when no interpretation is even
marginally better than any other, but rather when two or more reasonable, though not necessary
equally valid, interpretations exist.").
166. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 750 ("As the Court has changed the mix of 'tools' it uses
and the ways in which it uses those tools, it has gradually ceased to apply step two of the
Chevron test to uphold an agency construction of ambiguous statutory language, because it
rarely acknowledges the existence of ambiguity.").
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reaction to judges' abuse of the pragmatic approach. 167 It was an attempt on the
Court's part "to deter creative methods of divining legislative intent that
effectively allowed politically unaccountable judges to substitute their policy
preferences for those of politically accountable agencies." 68 Initially, the
Court's shift from pragmatism to textualism had the desired effect: Chevron
deference increased. 169 Unfortunately, textualism now resembles the extreme
versions of pragmatism that the textualists have long criticized; it suffers from
the same overuse and manipulation that plagued the pragmatic approach. In
fact, the Court's hypertextualist approach accords considerably less deference
to agency interpretations than was the case prior to Chevron.70 If the Court
continues to extend its hypertextualist approach to Chevron cases, lower courts
will have no alternative but to follow suit.' 71 Ultimately, the Court's current
approach to statutory construction will impair administrative attempts to
execute coherent national regulations and programs.
7 2
3. Administrative Action in an Unambiguous World
This aggressive application of textualism in administrative law will create
an environment in which agencies are greatly hindered in their attempts to
execute their congressionally delegated missions. 173 In one fell swoop, the
Court can eliminate the interpretation that an agency had relied upon for years
and completely undermine the foundation of the agency's regulatory
program. 174 Theoretically, if a court uses a hypertextualist approach to adopt an
167. See id. at 751 ("The Court created the deferential Chevron test in part to deter creative
methods of divining legislative intent that effectively allowed politically unaccountable judges
to substitute their policy preferences for those of politically accountable agencies.").
168. Id.
169. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984, 1029-41 (noting Chevron's initial
effect of increased deference).
170. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 752 (stating that "[tihe Court now rarely defers to an
agency's construction of ambiguous statutory language because a majority of Justices have now
begun to use textualist methods of construction").
171. See id. (stating that lower courts will be forced to adopt the hypertextualist method if
the Court persists in using it).
172. See id. (noting that "[i]f the court persists in its use of hypertextualism... [t]he
inevitable result will be cacophony and incoherence throughout the administrative state").
173. See id. at 763 (discussing the effects of hypertextualism on agency-administered
statutes).
174. See id. at 765-66 ("A court can eliminate the interpretive underpinning of an agency's
benefit or regulatory program after the agency has spent decades carefully constructing the many
elements of its program on that foundation.").
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interpretation that hinders an agency's performance, Congress could remedy
this result by amending the statute to comport with congressional intent.
175
This is easier said than done. Practically speaking, considerable barriers
prevent effective and efficient legislative correction of an erroneous judicial
interpretation. 176  Due to collective action problems, even if a statute is
disfavored by the majority of Congress, it is often extraordinarily difficult or
impossible to effect a change. 177 Thus, even if a hypertextualist interpretation
of an agency statute subverts legislative intent or undermines the regulatory
program, congressional attempts to amend the statute will likely fail.
If the Court feels free to choose a plain meaning that ignores congressional
intent, an agency may be forced to act in a way that will anger Congress. 178 In
contrast with the insulated courts, an agency could suffer severe consequences
if it ignores congressional policy preferences. 179 Courts' varying application of
the "plain meaning" rule creates internal inconsistencies: Under the
hypertextualist approach, each court could potentially attribute a different
meaning to a term simply by relying on a different dictionary.'80 This would
greatly hinder functionality by forcing an agency to deal with these judicially-
created inconsistencies. 81  Furthermore, a hypertextualist court could
implement its variation of the plain meaning rule at any time, thus eliminating
"the interpretive underpinning of an agency's benefit or regulatory program
after the agency has spent decades carefully constructing the many elements of
its program on that foundation." 1
82
175. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 764 n. 108 (discussing the impracticality of legislative
correction of judicial errors).
176. See id. (noting that "the obstacles to legislative correction of judicial errors are
formidable" (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 33 1, 353-90 (1991))).
177. See id. ("[D]emonstrating that it is often impossible for a collective body, like a
legislature, to eliminate a policy that is disfavored by a majority of members because no
alternative policy is supported by a majority of members." (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963))).
178. See id. at 764-66 (predicting that if lower courts begin to apply a hypertextualist
approach, agencies will "experience extreme difficulty in their efforts to perform their
statutorily-assigned missions").
179. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 765 ("Since courts also may feel free to ignore powerful
evidence that Congress intended a construction that differs from a plain meaning chosen by the




182. Id. at 765-76.
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It seems unlikely that the Court's agenda includes using a hypertextualist
approach to wreak havoc on the administrative state.183  Unfortunately,
although the textualist movement began as a reaction to abuse of legislative
history as a statutory interpretation aid, 84 textualism itself has fallen prey to
judicial manipulation and poses a threat to the future of the Chevron
doctrine. 185 The Court has dramatically transformed its approach to statutory
interpretation with unfortunate results for agency-administered statutes. As
Professor Pierce notes, "Unless the Court's agenda is to maximize the workload
of lawyers, judges, and agencies, and to minimize the coherence and efficacy of
agency-administered programs, it must return to the deferential approach it
announced in Chevron."'
' 86
IV. The Solution: A Two-Track Ambiguity Standard
To ameliorate the effect of hypertextualism on the administrative state, this
Note advocates a two-track ambiguity standard for statutory interpretation
cases. A hypertextualist analysis embraces "active ambiguity," a narrow
approach that has clearly detrimental effects on the administrative state. 87 To
combat these spill-over effects of hypertextualism, a broader "deferential
ambiguity" standard must be used by courts when agency interpretations are
involved. A finding of ambiguity has profound implications in the
administrative agency context because deference to an agency's interpretation
hinges upon a finding of ambiguity in Chevron step one. 88 As the Chevron
Court declared:
[T]he two-step structure makes deference an all-or-nothing matter. If the
court resolves the question at step one, then it exercises purely independent
183. See id. at 776 ("It seems unlikely that the Court's actual agenda is to maximize
incoherence and cacophony in the implementation of regulatory and benefit systems.").
184. See Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons, supra note 114, at 539 ("To some extent,
the revival of textualism during the 1980s was a healthy reaction to the misuse by many judges
of legislative history.").
185. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 3 54-5 5 ("For those who believe that judicial deference
to agency interpretations of law is a good thing, this [textualism] should be a cause for concern,
and provides some reason to question the wisdom of textualism, or at least the way the
deference doctrine is currently implemented through the Chevron doctrine.").
186. Pierce, supra note 4, at 776.
187. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the deference deteriorating effects of
hypertextualism on Chevron deference).
188. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (basing judicial deference on statutory silence or ambiguity with regard to the specific
issue at hand).
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judgment and gives no consideration to the [agency's] view. If it resolves
the question at step two, then it applies a standard of maximum
deference.' 
8 9
As Part II demonstrated, deference to agency interpretations provides
indispensable benefits to this country's modem governance.' 90 The deferential
approach to ambiguity strives to preserve these values.
A. Ambiguity as a Legal Concept
Ambiguity lies at the core of all statutory interpretation cases-as noted by
Justice Scalia, "[e]very statute that comes into litigation is to some degree
'ambiguous.'"" 9' A finding of ambiguity can be a "magically liberating factor"
for courts because that finding allows a judge to peek outside the text and
consider the statute in its broader context and purposes.192 By not finding
ambiguity, on the other hand, the court is free to ignore these broader objectives
and considerations of the statute. Thus, courts can manipulate ambiguity to
reach the desired result. Both textualists and pragmatists can play the
ambiguity card, selectively employing it as necessary.
This Note argues that the ultimate difficulty with the Court's ambiguity
jurisprudence is not that the justices use varied concepts of ambiguity to reach
inconsistent results. 93 Rather, it is that they do not candidly acknowledge this
practice. As the court has stated, "[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."' 94
Ambiguity is relative-both case law and commonsense make clear that the
ambiguity of a particular passage is not some objectively ascertainable fact.195
189. Merrill, Deference, supra note 81, at 977.
190. See discussion supra Part II.A-C (discussing the importance of Chevron to the
administrative state).
191. ScALiA,supra note 117, at28.
192. See Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A
Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MiNN. L. REv. 199, 214-15 (1999) (suggesting that
"like beauty, ambiguity is in the eye of the beholder").
193. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546,572 (2005) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (noting that Justice Ginsburg "demonstrated that 'ambiguity' is a term that may
have different meanings for different judges").
194. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
195. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (illustrating the subjectivity of words); see
also Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Ambiguity is apparently in the eye
of the beholder.").
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It is simply a legal conclusion drawn after application of the Court's preferred
definition of "ambiguity" to the given text.' 96 Yet the Court clings to a
simplistic, all-or-nothing concept of ambiguity, as evidenced by justices'
recurrent expressions of disbelief that their colleagues could possibly have read
a plainly unambiguous passage as ambiguous, or vice versa.1
97
Understanding the idea of ambiguity as an ordinary legal construct with a
range of context-specific meanings is critical to this Note's proposed solution.
Generally, hypertextualists favor a narrow concept of ambiguity when
constructing statutes. If hypertextualists fail to differentiate ambiguity within
the realm of Chevron, their Chevron analyses will produce results that impair
effective government and contradict the hypertextualists' credence ofjudicial
restraint. This Note offers a more realistic model of ambiguity analysis that
employs multiple standards: a narrow one for general statutory interpretation
and another, broader one for construing administrative statutes. In
distinguishing ambiguity based on context, hypertextualists will best serve their
ultimate ends.
B. The "Active" Ambiguity Standard versus the "Deferential" Ambiguity
Standard
Textualists, in using an active approach to ambiguity, "lose sight of
deference because they are consumed with finding imaginative and creative
ways of applying the few tools of statutory construction to which they have
limited themselves in their quest to discern the statute's plain meaning.'
98
Textualism, by its very nature, inhibits the value of Chevron deference to the
administrative state. 199 To prevent deterioration of the deference doctrine,
196. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325,332-33 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev'd,
519 U.S. 337 (1997) (providing an example of how different legal conclusions can be drawn
from the same language). The Fourth Circuit determined that the meaning of "employee" was
unambiguous, even though this literal interpretation produced a result contrary to the underlying
purposes of the statute. Id. at 332. In declaring the statute unambiguous, the Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that most of the other circuits had avoided a literal interpretation so as to comport
with the purposes of the statute, but noted that "these decisions fail to heed the Supreme Court's
repeated mandate" to follow the meaning of the text. Id. (citing Conn. Nat 'l Bank v. Germain,
503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)). Remarkably, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Thomas, reversed unanimously, concluding that "employee" was ambiguous. See Robinson,
519 U.S. at 340-45.
197. See Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that "the Court
has made the remarkable declaration that its reading of the statute is so obviously correct-and
Justice Ginsburg's so obviously wrong-that the text does not even qualify as 'ambiguous,").
198. Keller, supra note 20, at 615.
199. Id.
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judges must distinguish between the definition of ambiguity in the non-
administrative context and the definition of ambiguity in the administrative
context, where Chevron applies.
Courts use two approaches to ambiguity in statutory interpretation cases.
In the first approach-the one used implicitly in Exxon Mobil-a court finds
ambiguity only when the arguments for the alternative interpretations are in
absolute equipoise. 200 This will rarely, if ever, occur.20 1 For the purposes of
this Note, this narrow concept of ambiguity is classified as "active ambiguity,"
as it encourages judicial activism by allowing the judge or court to impose its
judgment as to what constitutes the "best" interpretation.
An alternative approach to ambiguity, the one intended by Chevron,
20 2
allows a court to declare a statute ambiguous whenever two or more reasonable
interpretations exist. In this approach, a court may not make a value judgment
on which interpretation is "better," so long as both interpretations are
permissible. Instead, the court must declare the statute ambiguous and move on
to interpretive sources such as legislative history, or, in the administrative
context, proceed to Chevron step two. For the purposes of this Note, this latter,
broader type of ambiguity is referred to as "deferential ambiguity," as it
comports with the deferential approach intended by Chevron.
The textualist methodology encourages predominant use of the active
ambiguity approach to statutory interpretation issues, which effectively
eliminates ambiguity.20 3 As discussed earlier, that result implicates serious
concerns for the future viability of the Chevron doctrine, and the administrative
state in general.2° If courts are unwilling to apply the deferential approach
consistently to determine ambiguity,20 5 they must, at the very least be willing to
200. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567 (2005)
(admitting that the Court selected, in the majority's opinion, the "best interpretation of§ 1367").
201. See Scalia, supra note 56, at 520 ("If the judicial mentality that is developed by such a
system were set to answering the question, 'When are the arguments for and against a particular
statutory interpretation in equipoise?,' I am certain that the response would be 'almost never."').
202. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.1 1
(1984) ("The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it
permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would
have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.").
203. See discussion supra Part III.B. 1 (arguing that textualist judges are less likely to defer
to an agency interpretation).
204. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 776 ("Unless the Court's agenda is to maximize the
workload of lawyers, judges, and agencies, and to minimize the coherence and efficacy of
agency-administered programs, it must return to the deferential approach it announced in
Chevron.").
205. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the consequences of this approach in the
non-administrative context.
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distinguish between general statutory interpretation cases and Chevron-type
cases. Thus, courts must carve out an exception for Chevron cases, diligently
recognizing the statute as ambiguous whenever reasonable and permissible
agency interpretations exist.
In these situations, the opposite of ambiguity must not be "resolvability,"
but rather "clarity., 20 6 So, "if Congress has clearly expressed an intent contrary
to that of the [a]gency," 207 the statute is unambiguous and the court has a duty
to enforce Congress's will. However, if congresssional intent is unclear, the
court must not "resolve" the issue by choosing the best interpretation or by
considering only the "ordinary meaning." Rather, as mandated by Chevron, the
court must declare a statute ambiguous whenever two or more reasonable
interpretations are presented and resist the temptation to impose its own
judgment, choosing the interpretation that yields the result most desirable to the
court.2 °8
Although the language of Chevron itself supports this distinction, courts
have drifted away from this traditional definition of ambiguity in their over-
zealous application of textualist tools. Rather than a cursory inquiry at step
one-merely asking itself subjectively whether the statute appears
ambiguous-the court should instead consider whether the language is
susceptible to the different interpretations proffered. If so, the court must make
an objective determination as to the reasonableness of the agency's
interpretation. The proposition seems too commonsense to merit much
discussion; if disagreement exists as to the meaning of a word, that word is
inherently ambiguous.
Exxon Mobil, however, proves that ambiguity is a more complicated
concept. A hypertextualist approach relegates alternative interpretations to a
dissent or to a footnote rather than seeing disagreement as an indication of
ambiguity.20 9 But, the mere fact that a court can discern an "ordinary meaning"
should not foreclose a finding of ambiguity, unless of course the "ordinary
meaning" is also the only permissible definition. For example, the issue in
Chevron was the appropriate definition of the term "source"210 in the Act. The
206. See Scalia, supra note 56, at 520 n.21 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter.") (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
207. Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (emphasis added).
208. See supra Part II.A-C (discussing the importance of Chevron to the administrative
state).
209. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 577-94 (2005)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (providing an alternative interpretation of § 1367).
210. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,866 (1984)
(holding that "the EPA's definition of the term 'source' is a permissible construction of the
statute which seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air pollution with economic growth").
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Court could conceivably have declared that the term "source" has an ordinary
or plain meaning. Instead, the Chevron Court recognized that the
Environmental Protection Agency was best positioned to interpret the term in
the context of its application to pollutant controls.21' Courts must be acutely
aware of the risks for the administrative state, associated closely with the
hypertextualist approach, of finding an "ordinary" meaning when one does not
exist, or of substituting a "best" interpretation for one by the agency. When
reasonable alternative explanations exist, a court must willingly admit
ambiguity.
C. Argument for Using the "Deferential" Ambiguity Approach in the
Administrative Context
The deferential ambiguity approach facilitates four generally desirable
results. First, it ensures that policy decisions are made by a politically-
accountable agency.212 Second, it allows these policy decisions to be made by
individuals with expertise.213 Third, it facilitates flexibility in statutory
interpretation.214 Finally, it guarantees a "nationally uniform approach to
statutory constructions."215
First, a deferential approach ensures that a politically-accountable agency
resolves statutory ambiguities. If statutory language is susceptible to multiple
constructions, the deferential approach mandates that a rational agency
interpretation prevails, even over the "ordinary meaning" of the statute or an
interpretation that the court may find superior. In contrast, the active ambiguity
approach allows the court to circumvent Chevron deference; by finding an
"ordinary meaning," the court is able to impose a judicially preferred
216interpretation. Consequently, an active approach allows a politically-
insulated court to impose its policy choices on a public to which it is not
accountable.217 The deferential approach recognizes that an administrative
agency is in a better position to resolve these kinds of policy choices. Unlike a
211. See id. at 865 (discussing the superiority of the agency in resolving policy questions).
212. See Keller, supra note 20, at 615 (discussing how textualism undermines "several
generally desirable results of deference").
213. See id. (noting that deference to agency interpretations ensures "that policy is made by
individuals who have specialized knowledge").
214. See id. (stating that deference allows for more flexible interpretations).
215. Id.
216. See id. at 615-16 (describing this very phenomenon in the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the NLRA).
217. See discussion supra Part II.C (describing Chevron as a political choice).
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politically-insulated court, an agency is open to the influence of the executive
branch and can better adjust its interpretations to reflect the public's changing
needs.21 8
Second, a deferential approach takes advantage of the agency's enhanced
expertise and specialized knowledge. Judges usually lack familiarity with the
complex and often highly technical issues that agencies consider.21 9 In
comparison, Congress equips agencies with the resources and tools necessary to
manage highly specific areas, a task simplified by the agency's institutional
knowledge. 220  The deferential standard asks the judge to assess only the
rationality of the agency interpretation rather than to subjectively determine its
correctness. The active approach encourages less-informed judges to make a
determination as to the "best" interpretation of the statute, potentially
undermining or rejecting the agency's well-reasoned construction. Statutory
interpretation in the administrative context is not enhanced by a hierarchy of
possible meanings from which the court selects a preferred interpretation. The
agency's interpretation must simply be reasonable, which is an important
distinction.
Thirdly, the deferential ambiguity standard ensures regulatory flexibility
by assuring that statutes subject to more than one interpretation are in fact
labeled ambiguous. The critical ambiguity classification prevents foreclosure
of future interpretations by the agency. Recently, the Supreme Court held that
if a court declares a statute "unambiguous," the agency is no longer the
authoritative interpreter of the statute and that it is barred from choosing a
different interpretation.221 Although a court interpretation of an ambiguous
statute does not foreclose future agency interpretations, the Court suggested that
a court could "remove" a preexisting ambiguity, and this principle would no
longer apply.
222
218. Supra Part I.C.
219. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (noting that a deference doctrine
discourages courts from using statutory interpretation as a means to impress policy preferences
upon the public).
220. Supra note 72 and accompanying text.
221. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,982
(2005) (holding that "[a] court's prior construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for
agency discretion").
222. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that this principle
"would not necessarily be applicable to a decision by this Court that would presumably remove
any pre-existing ambiguity").
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Consequently, a finding of ambiguity is the only way to ensure that
agencies are not constrained by stare decisis; ambiguity thus promotes the
regulatory flexibility essential to modem governance. As noted in Chevron:
"An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the
contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis. ' 223 Under
the active approach, if a court finds a plain or ordinary meaning and declares
the statute unambiguous, ajudicial interpretation does carve its construction in
stone. In contrast, a court applying the deferential standard is more likely to
find ambiguity, permitting the agency to respond appropriately in rapidly
224evolving, highly complex areas.
Finally, a deferential ambiguity approach helps to assure a nationally
225uniform approach to regulatory programs and statutory constructions.
Agency-administered statutes illustrate the need for agencies, as these statutes
typically include hundreds of provisions, "are plagued with ambiguities,
omissions, and internal inconsistencies, '' 26 and are thus subject to many
combinations of alternative interpretations. The utility of the agency is its
ability to choose the appropriate combination of constructions to implement227
effectively and efficiently its congressionally delegated mission. Although a
court may be able to draw a prudent construction of the statute at issue, it often
will not be the construction intended by Congress, or the one that the agency
found in the statute before judicial review of its work product.228 Most
important, if the court interpretation conflicts with the agency interpretation, the
agency will be unable to administer a nationally consistent program. The
deferential ambiguity approach seeks to avoid this result by giving the agency
interpretation priority, even if the court could conceivably discern an ordinary
or plain meaning from the text at issue.
In contrast, the active approach endorsed by hypertextualism undermines
an agency's ability to implement nationally uniform programs. Under a
hypertextualist analysis, one court may rely on a highly technical construction
223. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,863-64 (1984).
224. See supra Part II.B (discussing the importance of Chevron to administrative
flexibility).
225. See Keller, supra note 20, at 615 (arguing that the very nature of textualism "inhibits
several generally desirable results of deference").
226. Pierce, supra note 4, at 764.
227. See id. (discussing how agencies often must deal with "a statutory environment in
which a single statute can support millions of combinations of alternative constructions").
228. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864 (stating that the court of appeals read the statute
inflexibility and contrary to congressional intent and the agency interpretation).
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• • 229of a phrase and disregard a carefully reasoned agency interpretation. Another
court may consider the same phrase, discern an ordinary meaning, and adopt a
different construction. 23 0 By allowing different courts to discern conflicting
plain or ordinary meanings from the same statutory language, the active
approach to ambiguity undermines agency attempts to administer coherent
regulatory schemes.
D. Deferential Ambiguity Advances Textualist Objectives
A deferential concept of ambiguity reconciles textualism's underlying
objectives better than does an active approach. At first glance, the active
ambiguity approach appears to advance textualist goals. It decreases findings
of ambiguity and purports to focus objectively on the text. In the administrative
context, however, an active approach is actually counter-productive to the
primary goals of textualism. Instead of promoting judicial minimalism, an
active approach encourages judicial activism by allowing a court to declare its
judgment as to the "best" interpretation of the statute. Unelected judges are
effectively legislating from the bench. In contrast, a deferential ambiguity
approach prevents this judicial usurpation of power-when the statutory
language is susceptible to multiple meanings, the deferential approach allows
the agency to determine the appropriate interpretation of the statute at hand.
Congress authorizes an agency to administer its respective legislation and
anticipates interpretation by the agency of the inevitable ambiguities within the
statutory language. Hence, a deferential ambiguity approach should satisfy
judicial conservatives (a group that includes most textualists) because that
approach honors congressional intent.
Textualists are uncomfortable with legislative history, which they consider
unreliable. Accordingly, one of the underlying goals of textualism is to
eliminate or reduce the use of legislative history and other pragmatic
interpretation tools. 231  While this concern may be valid in the non-
administrative context, it has no place in cases governed by Chevron. Chevron
recognizes that Congress delegates the task of implementing and interpreting
statutes and programs to federal agencies. Most legislation is fraught with
229. See supra Part I (presenting a real world example of this situation).
230. Supra Part I.
231. See SCALiA, supra note 117, at 29-30 (concluding that "legislative history should not
be used as an authoritative indication of a statute's meaning"); see also Merrill, supra note 29,
at 352 (noting that the practical effect of textualism is to "banish virtually all consideration of
legislative history from statutory interpretation").
620
RUNNING ON EMPTY
internal tensions and ambiguities. A deferential ambiguity approach provides
results consistent with congressional intent: It is the agency's province to focus
on the policies that motivated Congress to pass the legislation and, on that
basis, to interpret the ambiguities within the statute in a manner consistent with
those underlying objectives. This approach does not ask an extrinsic-source-
averse textualist to weigh policy arguments or to wade through legislative
history; rather, a deferential approach allows the better equipped agency to
consider these resources. Using this approach, a court's task is only to assess
the reasonableness of the agency interpretation, just as Chevron mandates.232
Textualists using an active ambiguity standard are prone to resolve
Chevron questions at step one by finding a plain or unambiguous meaning in
language that is often susceptible to multiple interpretations. A deferential
ambiguity approach reconciles textualist objectives in the administrative
context while mitigating the incidental effects of hypertextualist analysis. It
does not require judicial use of the pragmatic interpretation tools that textualists
find so objectionable. It encourages judicial minimalism by giving priority to
permissible agency interpretations (and, implicitly, to congressional intent) over
judicially preferred interpretations. The deferential ambiguity standard ought to
be acceptable to textualists. Rather than a contradiction, the textualist two step
can become a reality in Chevron cases.
V Conclusion
The hypertextualist trend, if checked, is not necessarily cause for alarm.
After all, it is the judge's province to read and interpret the laws.233 As noted
by Justice Scalia, the poster child of the textualist movement, ajudge's "highest
responsibility in the field of statutory construction is to read the laws in a
consistent way, giving Congress a sure means by which it may work the
people's will."234 A judge's job is not to "psychoanalyze" Congress by sifting
through murky and often contradictory legislative history.235 There is certainly
a time and a place for the use of a textualist judicial philosophy-when the
232. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
("In these cases the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of
manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical
and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the
decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.").
233. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the practice of
judicial review).
234. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 417 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. Id.
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meaning of the statute is truly unambiguous and Congress's intent is
unmistakably clear. Clearly, there is great value in the appropriate use of
textualist tools of statutory construction. The trend of late, however, is an
aggressive application of textualism and an overuse of clear-statement rules to
narrow statutory meaning.236 This shift has implications for all statutory
interpretation cases. The most worrisome implication of the trend is its
potential to eliminate findings of ambiguity, a phenomenon that poses serious
risks in the area of administrative law. The greatest cause for concern stems
from "the extremes to which the Court has gone in its use (or abuse) of
textualist tools to the exclusion of other evidence of legislative intent and with
the effect of virtually emasculating the Chevron doctrine. 
2 37
If courts consistently employ the statutory interpretation methods used in
Exxon Mobil, the Chevron doctrine will become virtually meaningless. If
Chevron is to have any lasting value, courts must be willing to find ambiguity
not just when one interpretation is preferable to another, but rather "when two
or more reasonable, though not necessarily equally valid, interpretations
exist. '238 The Exxon Mobil Court used the "active ambiguity" approach in
order to declare the statute at issue unambiguous, recognizing that alternative
explanations existed but choosing what the majority felt was the "best"
interpretation. 239 This approach has no place in the administrative arena.
The deferential approach to ambiguity must be accepted in Chevron-
applicable cases, if Chevron is to have any meaning at all. Thus, in
determining what constitutes an "ambiguity," courts must distinguish between
non-administrative law cases, such as Exxon Mobil, and administrative law
cases in which Chevron applies. Rather than determining congressional intent
by using "traditional tools of statutory construction," courts should simply
assess the permissibility of the agency's interpretation, not its correctness.
24°
236. See Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons, supra note 114, at 528 (discussing the
revival of textualist statutory interpretation).
237. Pierce, supra note 4, at 752.
238. Scalia, supra note 56, at 520.
239. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567 (2005). The
majority stated:
The proponents of the alternative view of § 1367 insist that the statute is at least
ambiguous and that we should look to other interpretive tools .... We can reject
this argument at the very outset simply because § 1367 is not ambiguous .... Even
if we were to stipulate, however, that the reading these proponents urge upon us is
textually plausible.., it would not alter our view as to the best interpretation of
§ 1367.
Id. (emphasis added).
240. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23,484 U.S. 112, 123
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The modem reality is that courts' use of hypertextualism is not likely to abate
anytime soon. The approach used in Exxon Mobil may not be cause for alarm
outside of the administrative context, but within the administrative state, an
exception must be carved out if the meaning of Chevron is to be preserved.
Ambiguity fuels Chevron-but after Exxon Mobil, Chevron may be running on
empty.
(1987) (stating that under the Chevron principle, the court traditionally accords deference to an
agency interpretation "so long as its interpretation is rational and consistent with the statute").

